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Differing Aims Test Unity of Atlantic Powers

WASHINGTON—The ceremonial signing of the North Atlantic pact in Washington on April 4 gives the United States a chance to concentrate on a foreign policy of leadership instead of one of opposition. Since the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine two years ago, American policy has consisted basically of a series of responses to Russian actions. Even the negotiation of the pact was one more step in the comprehensive effort to oppose the tendencies of the Soviet Union. The United States and other Western powers have put their energies to building barricades. If the pact, however, results, as its signers hope, in the creation of a zone of security in North America and Western and Southern Europe beyond the reach of Russian influence and impregnable to armed attack, the partners in the pact, under the leadership of the United States, will be able to initiate policies that are based on more forceful considerations than the current dominating concern for simply halting communism.

Once the pact is operative, the United States may find that in the long run it can strengthen itself for the rivalry with Russia—in this era of economic change and social ferment—by backing programs that attract the support of those uncomfortable peoples and groups which Communists are trying to win over by appeals to their desire for change. The West, for example, can improve the lot and probably affect the political leanings of the restless peoples of Southeast Asia by carrying through Point Four of President Truman's Inaugural Address on January 20 calling for the development of

underdeveloped areas. Now that the preliminary steps for creating the North Atlantic alliance are complete, representatives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and the Food and Agriculture Organization have begun to consider in Washington various ways of turning Point Four into reality.

Discords in Alliance

Effective American leadership of the North Atlantic signatories depends on the ability of those powers to settle their differences. They stand together on their common objection to Soviet foreign policy, but they disagree among themselves on many other matters. For that reason, it was fortunate that, in the days immediately after the signing, the Foreign Ministers of our eleven Western allies remained in Washington, where they conferred with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and one another. It was an impressive diplomatic conclave of the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Italy and Canada.

The principal point of disagreement with which they wrestled was Germany, where, despite formal agreements for unification of their zones, the three Western occupying powers, America, Britain, and France, have been unable to agree on economic aspects of the merger, on a trizonal occupation statute, or on the kind of government they will permit the Western Germans to set up. The Atlantic powers do not embarrass Russia by their failure

to concur on a German policy. They disagree also on Italy's desire, which Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza expressed when he arrived in America for the signing of the pact, to regain its African colonies. The policy of the Netherlands in continuing its war with the Indonesian Republic despite cease-fire orders of the United Nations is another point of contention. Reflecting a common American attitude, Senator Owen Brewster, Republican, of Maine, offered an amendment to the European Recovery Program bill to bar recovery assistance to countries that do not follow UN decisions. The alliance can become a positive force only if it develops into a kind of diplomatic union where agreement is the order of the day.

Russian Reaction

The failure to attain that unity on a larger geographical scale through the UN precipitated the steps taken to establish the North Atlantic alliance. In his address at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 31 Winston Churchill, leader of the British Conservative party, asked rhetorically why the Russians have "deliberately acted so as to unite the free world against them?" He said he believed that Russian government leaders fear "the friendship of the West more than its hostility. They cannot afford to allow free and friendly intercourse to grow up between the vast area they control and the civilization of the West."

Whether that analysis is sound or unsound, the Soviet government is responding to the pact by further limiting its intercourse with the West. A Soviet note

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to the American government on April 1 protesting the North Atlantic pact fore-shadowed possible renunciation by Moscow of its treaties of alliance with Britain (signed on May 26, 1942) and France (December 10, 1944). The note protested that the pact "is directed against the U.S.S.R." and "the countries of peoples' democracy," "has nothing in common with . . . the aims and principles of the United Nations" and "absolutely ignores the possibility of a repetition of German aggression." The prospects created by the pact, however, have not thus far immobilized Soviet foreign policy.

The Bulgarian and Albanian governments and the leadership of the Greek Communists—three groups friendly to Russia—are harassing the Tito regime in Yugoslavia, which is at odds with Russia, by agitating for the creation of an independent state of Macedonia, part of which would be carved from Yugoslavia. Under Russian stimulation, Communists in Eastern Germany are propagandizing their Western compatriots with the message that Britain, France, and the United States are preventing the unification of Germany by their plan for establishing a Western German state. Russia also is pressing the

flanks of the North Atlantic alliance by seeking the comeback of the suppressed Tudeh (Communist) party in Iran. Secretary Acheson on March 23 denied Moscow radio allegations that America is turning Iran into a military base for action against Russia. But he repeated his statement of March 19 that American interest in the security of Iran has "been made clear, and we shall continue to pursue that policy." Thus the East-West conflict continues, and there remain important areas of the world in which the United States has not yet won the initiative from Russia.

BLAIR BOLLES

U.S. Weighs Role of Military in German Occupation

FRANKFORT—On the well laid-out grounds in front of the huge I.G. Farben Building which houses offices of the United States Military Government, the ECA, and agencies of the bizon, yellow and violet crocuses are suddenly springing out of earth that only yesterday was powdered with snow. Welcoming this first touch of spring, the inhabitants of Frankfort ask themselves whether this may yet prove a false promise, to be followed by another frost.

More Questions Than Answers

Comparable questions rise in one's mind about the future of Germany. Nearly four years after V-E Day the Germans of the Western zones are unquestionably resuming their economic activities and are receiving from the victors a far better deal than anyone could have anticipated at the time of unconditional surrender. Faces are brighter, spirits more buoyant than in 1945. But the material ruins—the rubble swept neatly to one side but not removed—remain for all to see. And one wonders how great and lasting may be the moral ruins that are only partly visible to non-Germans. Everyone, including old timers among Americans who entered Germany as conquerors and remained here in military or civilian status, asks questions about the future. Few are ready to venture even tentative answers.

How long should the Allied occupation continue? It is generally felt (except by those who have obtained better jobs and a more comfortable life in Germany than they could command at home) that prolonged occupation has a demoralizing effect on both rulers and ruled not unlike the effect of colonial administration which, no matter how benevolent it may be, tends

to distort human relations. The occupiers have two choices. They must either set up a separate world of their own, from which the occupied are excluded—with the result that a contemptuous attitude toward the "natives" emerges, precluding communication on a basis of equality and, by that token, precluding also the possibility of knowing with any certainty what the "natives" think. (No American can see, without a start, signs reading "for indigenous personnel only.") Or else the occupiers have to be ready to associate with the "natives"—but then in Germany, as in colonial areas, the tendency is to associate with the "nice" people. This usually means people who had or still have wealth and are either very conservative in political and economic outlook or once found it just as convenient to get along with the Nazis as they now do with Americans. Thus, even if the occupiers step out of their own world into that of the Germans, they for the most part see only a small top layer of the population and again, as they are the first to admit, cannot know much about the inner thoughts of the Germans.

Relations between occupiers and occupied are further complicated by the fact that, through force of circumstances, the facade of occupation seen by most Germans is more military than civilian. The United States Military Government, under the leadership of General Lucius D. Clay, has done a highly efficient job in a constructive and, in many respects, imaginative spirit, avoiding the pitfalls of both undue sentimentality and undue harshness. Nevertheless, military government—no matter how good its intentions and praiseworthy its performance—by reason of its professional orientation and of the

objectives it is directed to achieve, tends to create within its own personnel, as well as among the Germans, a pattern of unquestioning acceptance of authority which makes it difficult both for occupiers and occupied to operate on the basis of democratic give and take that constitutes such an important aspect of American life. It is only too easy for Germans skeptical about democracy to detect in military government some of the features of authoritarianism for which only yesterday they heard themselves criticized by the rest of the world.

What Kind of Occupation?

Given these and other problems of Allied occupation, what should be done in the future? No responsible Allied spokesman here favors an early end of occupation. Some fear that it would merely invite Russia to occupy all of Germany; others fear even more that it would open up a veritable Pandora's box of German hatreds, ambitions and vengeance whose lid is now being firmly held down by the Allies. But if occupation is to last for an indefinite number of years, should its character be changed? As early as 1945 some observers had pointed out the advisability of transferring authority over the occupation from military to civilian hands.* The military themselves urged this course after the war—although it should be pointed out that during the war no opportunity had been given civilian agencies to prepare for the tasks of occupation. When invited by the War Department to take over, the Department of State declined on the ground that it did not have adequate personnel. As is well known, American policy on Ger-

*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November 9, 1945.

many has since then been determined by decisions stemming from several sources—the War Department, the Department of State, more recently also the ECA.

The key problem today is not to substitute State Department personnel for the Military who have (and, if West-East tension persists, will continue to have) important strategic and logistic tasks to perform here for which civilians are not trained. What is needed is to entrust a civilian agency—presumably the Department of State—with final authority over the making of policy on Germany. Then

policy, once agreed on, by all interested agencies in Washington, could be implemented on the spot by military and civilians alike. This is the pattern followed by the British, whose Military Governor, Sir Brian Robertson, General Clay's opposite number, receives his instructions from the Foreign Office after decisions have been reached in London on the cabinet level. While some Americans compare the British performance here unfavorably with that of the United States, the British clear line of authority from civilian to military deserves study in the

United States. Otherwise the occupation, instead of helping to democratize the Germans, as it hopes to do, may merely confirm them in their predilection for authoritarianism. And there is a constant danger that American policy toward Germany will be cast in the necessarily narrow mould of occupation objectives when it should be meshed with the larger objectives of the United States in Europe and the world.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of three articles on current trends in Germany.)

Can Britain Reconcile Divergent African Interests?

Britain's new emphasis on Africa as a source of future strength, prestige and plenty presents Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Labor government with the difficult task of combining divergent tendencies in the conduct of its colonial policy. Essentially, the difficulty is the same as that which has confronted other and older imperialisms: it consists of finding means to advance colonial peoples toward self-government simultaneously with the development of the resources of their territories.

African Stability

Strategic considerations also play a significant part in Britain's renewed interest in Africa. The military importance of British possessions south of the Sahara, demonstrated in World War II when the Axis dominated the Mediterranean, has recently been emphasized by the loss of Palestine, by curtailment of the British garrison in Egypt at Cairo's insistence, and by the continued turmoil in the Middle East. Kenya already has begun to replace points farther north as a base for protection of the Suez Canal. New freedom for India, Pakistan and Ceylon as dominions within the Commonwealth, independence for Burma outside it, and ferment in Malaya are further reasons for turning towards a relatively stable continent—a continent, moreover, where British influence faces no serious challenge from other great powers.

In addition, Africa offers what Britain in its present economic position needs. It is now a source of both food and raw materials. Given proper development, it may become a more bountiful source, reducing the British need for imports from the dollar area and earning dollars on its own by the export of African goods to the Western Hemisphere. These con-

siderations have prompted London's haste, enthusiasm and hope in drawing up and implementing plans for the growing of East African peanuts, the improvement and extension of communications, the construction of hydroelectric plants and other projects primarily designed to expand African agriculture. Considerable amounts of British public funds have already been invested in these programs; private investment has been encouraged; and popular interest, accompanied by increased emigration to the colonies, has been heightened. Inevitably the accent at home has been on the benefits to be gained by the British Isles—more margarine, an increase in the meat ration at some future date, larger supplies of tobacco. Such items, although they may seem minor, are the manifestations by which Britons identify their own crisis.

The question that arises is whether the coming era for Africa is to take the form of a Labor imperialism bent on "exploitation" under modern guise. The Labor party, which during its years in opposition served as a parliamentary voice for the aspirations of colonial peoples, is sensitive to this charge—which comes regularly from Communists at home and abroad, from some Africans and sometimes from British Conservatives. Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies who has long been a leading Labor expert in this field, and members of his staff have been careful to give a prominent place in all their plans to provisions for African welfare and advancement. Centuries of experience have taught the Colonial Office how the development of backward and impoverished areas can lead to explosive social changes.

Despite good intentions and a fund of colonial know-how, the combination of

development and welfare—in its broadest sense, including education, political responsibility and an attack on African poverty—will not be easy. John Strachey, British Minister of Food, told the House of Commons March 14 that the East African peanut program would bring real and permanent benefit to the African people because it was "hard-hearted and not philanthropic." It would bring them "painful problems," inaugurating a hectic and extraordinary period of their history. But, he added, the alternative to such development is stagnation, overcrowding on the native lands and continued malnutrition.

New Tendency

The peanut program, which calls for the creation of large mechanized plantations, marks a departure from previous colonial policy. The plantation system can only lead to further "detrribalization" of Africans, profoundly changing their old social patterns and ways of life and livelihood. The Colonial Office in the past has resisted efforts by Europeans to expand this type of agriculture in both East and West Africa. The Tanganyika project, however, is utilizing land presently uninhabited, and the Labor government feels that it can safeguard native rights under a public administration at the same time that it reaps the benefits of large-scale production.

Another facet of the problem inherent in the opening up of Africa is the continent's need for Europeans and European skills. Greatest progress in tapping natural resources has been made in the territories with the largest white populations—in the Union of South Africa, in Kenya and in Southern Rhodesia. The natives of these areas tend to be better off in per capita money incomes and in

educational opportunities than their fellows in less developed regions. However, the white man when he comes to the eastern dependencies of Africa, where the highlands offer opportunities for permanent settlement, seeks his own fortune and the means to keep it secure. This results in discriminatory legislation and economic practices designed to keep the natives as a source of unskilled labor. Where the Colonial Office intervenes to prevent this, European settlement—and economic development—is retarded. Nor can the Colonial Office easily resist the demands of British settlers—with their own interests at stake and their own on-the-spot knowledge of Africa—for a greater part in political and economic decisions.

The time for the political test in British East and Central Africa has not yet arrived. Nationalism has not gripped the native populations to the extent it has in West Africa, but a gradual awakening, which cannot fail to be stimulated by increased economic activity, is taking place. The spectre of communism has already been discerned by Europeans in the colonies and by Labor government leaders in Britain. The reason for this is not so much the political awareness of Africans as the fact that the British Communist party has undertaken to replace the Labor party as the sounding board for native fears, resentments and aspirations. The volume of protest, whether it is channeled through the Communist movement or elsewhere, can be expected to rise, for such is the pattern by which self-government and political responsibility are eventually won.

WILLIAM W. WADE

(The last in a series of three articles on developments in British East and Central Africa.)

Britain Today

For an up-to-date analysis of the political and economic scene in Britain, READ:

BRITAIN'S ROAD TO RECOVERY

by Mildred Adams

March-April issue of the

Headline Series—35 cents

News in the Making

The UN General Assembly, which convened at Flushing Meadows April 5, faced an agenda of twenty-three unresolved issues, most of them disputes of long standing. Of the major questions, only *Israel's application for UN membership* is expected to get early, favorable action. . . . Most important work for the delegates is probably the task of deciding the *future of Italy's colonies*. Under the terms of the Italian peace treaty, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and France have agreed to accept a General Assembly decision taken by a two-thirds majority. If the United States, Britain and France can reach an agreement, such a vote may be mustered. . . . Continued East-West controversy is expected over *Spain*. Poland is seeking a new resolution censuring the Franco regime; the United States and Britain favor a more conciliatory policy; although neither is likely to take the initiative or advocate Spanish membership in the UN. The question of withdrawing diplomatic sanctions against Spain has been overshadowed by the problem of whether or not to bring the Franco regime into full economic and military partnership with the West. The Salazar dictatorship of Portugal, a signatory of the North Atlantic pact, has announced that Spain's absence can "only weaken the role which the Iberian peninsula, as a strategic bloc of the highest importance, might be called to fulfill." . . . Other issues up for Assembly discussion include: trials of religious leaders in Hungary and Bulgaria; the status of the Indian minority in South Africa; a resolution on freedom of information; Trygve Lie's proposal for a force of UN guards; and Little Assembly recommendations concerning voluntary restriction of the veto in the Security Council. . . . Meanwhile in *China peace delegates* representing the Communists and acting President Li Tsung-jen's government in Nanking began negotiations in Peiping on April 2. In messages denouncing the Nationalist regime's "counter-revolutionary civil war" and the North Atlantic pact, Communist leader Mao Tse-tung waved the red flag in one hand,

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

*CLEVELAND, April 12, *Are We Still Good Neighbors?* Alberto Lleras

NEW ORLEANS, April 13, *Britain's Socialistic Government*, John Wilmot

*PHILADELPHIA, April 19, *Behind the Iron Curtain*, Lt. General Walter Bedell Smith

CINCINNATI, April 22, *North Atlantic Pact*, Brooks Emeny, William Verity, William Hessler

CINCINNATI, April 22-23, *Council of FPA Branches and Affiliates*

*Data taken from printed announcement

FPA Book Shelf

The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, an Analysis with Particular Reference to Recent Treaty Practice and Tariffs, by Richard C. Snyder. New York, King's Crown Press, 1948. \$2.75

This study based primarily upon recent treaty practice, particularly from 1919 to 1939, will be of special value to the international lawyer and student of international trade. The author, who is an Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University, has included an extensive selective bibliography and a closely reasoned interpretation of the significance of this clause in a world of complex economic interdependence.

As We See Russia, by Members of the Overseas Press Club of America. New York, Dutton, 1948. \$3.75

An uncommonly interesting collection of essays on Russia by American correspondents who have spent varying periods of time in the U.S.S.R. and have come back with a widely varying range of views.

Prisoners of War. Washington, Institute of World Policy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1948. \$1.50

A unique synthesis of the pragmatic approach of ex-prisoners of war, studying for foreign service, and the technical expert with administrative and legal experience is provided in this study which grew out of the guided consultations and discussions of a group of students and experts at Georgetown University. It focuses attention not only on an analysis of past problems and practice but also on recommendations for future revision of international agreements for the treatment of prisoners of war.

Workshop of Security, by Paul Hasluck. London, F. W. Cheshire, distributed by P. S. and Ione Perkins, South Pasadena, California, 1948, \$3.50

Mr. Hasluck, former Australian representative on the UN Security Council, gives a first-hand account of the working of the Security Council and of the personalities of its members.

holding out the olive branch in the other to "war-criminals" who repented of their ways and decided to support the "people's liberation."

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